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inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the 
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How should a high school principal respond to 
an informal poll about music for the upcoming 
prom if half the students want one type of music 
played and half want another? The principal 
could conceivably resolve this confl ict in various 
ways. We believe, however, that the acceptability 
of the possible solutions will depend on whether 
the division is associated with social category 
membership. In particular, our research explores 
the hypothesis that third party deciders are 
less comfortable resolving preference disputes 
with winner-take-all solutions when disputing 
factions belong to different social categories than 
when they belong to the same social category. 
Tossing a coin in the case of the differing 
musical preferences, for example, would be a 
less acceptable mode of resolution when the 
preferences are divided along ethnic or gender 
lines than when they are not. 
Based on theory and research from the 
social categorization and social comparison 
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literatures (e.g. Garcia, Tor, Bazerman, & Miller, 
2005; McGarty, 1999; Wenzel, 2001, 2002), we 
propose that third parties’ expectations about 
the magnitude of the affective disparity (hedonic 
gap) that arises between the winners and losers 
of a preference dispute are greater when the 
disputed preferences cleave along social category 
lines than when they do not. Consequently, 
people become more averse to winner-take-all 
solutions in the former case than in the latter. 
We do not deny, of course, that preferences can 
themselves form the basis of group membership. 
As a long line of research in the minimal group 
tradition suggests (see Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1969, 
1981), people are quick to form group identities 
around even the most trivial characteristics 
(e.g. preferences for one geometric shape over 
another). Our claim is simply that any identity 
polarization that emerges over a preference 
dispute is compounded when the disputed 
preferences correlate with other meaningful 
social category memberships. 
Why social categories matter
Winner-take-all distributions are commonly 
imposed when assets or liabilities cannot be 
divided equally or when statistical randomization 
(e.g. through a coin toss or lottery) is desired 
(Beggan, Platow, & McClintock, 1991; Bolton, 
Brandts, & Ockenfels, 2005; Elster, 1989, 
1992). Previous research has already begun to 
explore the intersection of social categories and 
distributive outcomes. Perceptions of distributive 
justice, for instance, vary depending on whether 
people belong to the same or different social 
categories (e.g. Wenzel, 2001, 2002). Although 
people may feel more entitled to outcomes 
that benefit themselves rather than others, 
relevant social categories can dramatically alter 
perceptions of entitlement. Wenzel (2002), for 
example, explored how perceived entitlement 
to common pay changes with the level of 
identifi cation with a social category. Wenzel 
found that the more strongly participants 
identifi ed with an ingroup, the more likely they 
were to forego self-interest and reward a fellow 
ingroup member who exemplifi ed the strengths 
of the group. 
But why should the fact that different sides 
in a dispute belonging to the same or different 
social categories affect the willingness of a third 
party to impose a solution that sees one of them 
win and the other lose? The answer, we contend, 
is that third parties believe winner-take-all solu-
tions to disputes in which preferences divide 
along social category lines will create a hedonic 
gap—an affective disparity—between the winners 
and losers. This hypothesis is consistent with 
the widely accepted premises that (a) people 
attach emotional value to their social category 
memberships (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, 1999; 
Deaux, 1996; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Tajfel, 1981) 
and (b) competitive events can make more salient 
the social categories involved in inter-category 
confl ict (Brewer, 1979). It is also consistent with 
research that shows that people’s willingness to 
tolerate disadvantageously unequal outcomes 
(e.g. we get $400 / they get $500) diminishes as 
a function of the meaningfulness of the social 
categories involved (Garcia et al., 2005).
In a series of studies, Garcia et al. (2005) found 
that resource allocation recipients were less 
averse to unequal allocations when all recipients 
were members of the same social category 
than when they belonged to different social 
categories. For example, in one study, Garcia 
and his colleagues asked University of Michigan 
(UM) participants to imagine a hotel vacancy 
dilemma involving traveling groups of students 
from UM and Harvard. The participants were 
asked to recommend a solution: Should both 
UM and Harvard student groups stay at a 1-star 
motel (Option A), or, for reasonable logistical 
reasons, should UM students stay at a 2-star 
hotel and Harvard students at a 4-star hotel 
(Option B)? Note that Option B is the quality 
maximizing option, but produces disadvantage-
ous inequality. A control condition was similar, 
except that two UM groups were traveling 
together and Option B specified that the 
participant herself/himself would be put in 
the 2-star hotel. Results showed that the UM 
participants in the control condition maximized 
the quality of the hotel in which they would 
be staying themselves (choosing Option B). 
However, in the experimental condition, the 
UM participants opted for a lower quality hotel 
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(choosing Option A), presumably because 
they anticipated that the pain of upward social 
comparison (Brickman & Bulman, 1977) caused 
by Harvard students enjoying a better hotel was 
greater than the pain caused by residing in a 
1-star rather than a 2-star hotel themselves. 
Garcia et al. (2005) focused on the willingness 
of group members themselves to tolerate dis-
advantageous inequality depending on whether 
the allocation occurred across or within social 
categories. The following studies focused on the 
impact of this factor on third party deciders. 
Although third parties do not experience the pain 
of upward social comparison per se, we contend 
that they do expect the affective disparity, or 
hedonic gap, between winning and losing sides 
of a winner-take-all solution to be greater in 
inter-category than intra-category disputes. In 
other words, just as payoff recipients prefer equal 
outcomes in inter-category allocations, in order 
to avert the pain of upward social comparison, 
so too will third parties become averse to winner-
take-all outcomes in inter-category disputes, in 
order to preempt a hedonic gap. And to the 
extent that people assume a winner-take-all 
outcome will produce a greater hedonic gap 
between winners and losers in an inter-category 
compared to an intra-category dispute, we predict 
that such solutions will be chosen less often in 
the former than in the latter case. 
Study 1: Flipping a coin
Study 1 examined whether the preferred mode 
of resolution for disputes between individuals 
depends on the relation between the disput-
ants. Our prediction was that the aversion to a 
winner-take-all solution would be greater when 
the disputants belonged to different social cat-
egories than when they belonged to the same 
social category. 
Method
Participants Forty-nine University of Michigan 
undergraduates volunteered to participate. 
Research assistants recruited the students in 
the lobby of a campus library by asking them if 
they would be willing to participate in a short 
survey on decision-making. 
Procedure Participants read about an intra-
category or an inter-category preference dispute 
involving hotel arrangements for the ‘UM Class 
Reunion of 1994’. None of the participants 
belonged to this 10-year reunion class. The 
intra-category version read as follows: 
The Class of 1994 is deciding where to host their 
class reunion. Six hundred alumni were asked 
to rank a list of seven possible hotels. As you can 
see below, the alumni are divided on their fi rst 
choice: Half the alumni want the Marriott and half 
the alumni want the Hyatt. In fact, as you can see 
below, they do not agree until their fourth choice, 
the Radisson Hotel. 
Participants were then shown a table listing 
the seven top hotel choices of the two groups. The 
preferences of one side (in order of preference) 
were: Marriott, Westin, Hyatt, Radisson, Hilton, 
Sheraton, and Doubletree. The preferences of 
the other side were: Hyatt, Doubletree, Marriott, 
Radisson, Westin, Hilton, and Sheraton. The 
Radisson was the agreed fourth choice and the 
fi rst choice of each side was actually the third 
choice of the other. The inter-category version was 
identical, except that ‘In-state and out-of-state 
alumni are divided over their fi rst choice. In-
state alumni want the Marriott and out-of-state 
alumni want the Hyatt’. All participants were 
then asked, ‘If only the following options were 
available, where should the reunion be held?’ 
The two options were (a) fl ip a coin for their 
fi rst choice (Heads = Marriott, Tails = Hyatt); 
and (b) choose the Radisson. Participants who 
expressed interest after completing the survey 
were then told more about the study.
Results and discussion
The results showed that 84% of the participants 
in the intra-category condition favored tossing a 
coin to decide which of the two groups got their 
fi rst choice hotel. The remaining 16% favored 
the Radisson Hotel as a compromise. A very 
different pattern emerged in the inter-category 
condition. There only 58% favored tossing a coin, 
while 42% favored choosing the Radisson Hotel 
as a compromise. The two conditions differed 
signifi cantly in their preferences (χ2(1) = 3.95, 
p < .05). Although random solutions, such as 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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tossing a coin, are generally viewed as procedurally 
fair (Blount, 1995; Bolton, et al., 2005), the 
results clearly showed that people are not as 
comfortable accepting winner-take-all solutions 
when the disputing parties belong to different 
social categories. Indeed, a sizable fraction of 
participants (42%) chose a suboptimal option 
for both parties in order to avoid a winner-take-
all solution. 
Study 2: An arbiter
Study 1 found that people did not want to resolve 
an inter-category dispute by tossing a coin. This 
result could refl ect an aversion to winner-take-
all solutions for such disputes, but it could also 
simply refl ect a reluctance to resolve a dispute 
by chance when groups from different social 
categories are involved. Study 2 thus sought to 
demonstrate that discomfort with winner-take-
all solutions in inter-category disputes does not 
depend on the means (random or not) by which 
the winners and losers are determined. In this 
study, the winner-take-all decision was made by 
an arbiter rather than by chance.
Method
Participants Thirty-eight undergraduate stu-
dents participated in a questionnaire study 
that was part of a larger experimental session 
conducted at the Harvard Business School. 
Participants received US$15 to $30 for partici-
pating in the session. The variation in pay 
refl ected a number of other studies bundled with 
ours in which students had the opportunity to 
earn more or less money. However, it is doubtful 
that there could have been any differences in 
their responses due to pay, because participants 
did not know their total earnings until after the 
entire session.
Procedure Participants read a brief scenario 
about a dispute over the color of the Merrill 
Lynch company logo. The intra-category version 
read as follows: ‘The American offi ce of Merrill 
Lynch is deciding the color of the company logo. 
Half the offi ce wants the color blue, while the 
other half wants the color red’. The inter-category 
version was identical, except that ‘The American 
offi ce wants the color blue and the French 
offi ce wants the color red’. Participants were 
then asked: ‘If only the following options were 
available, how should the color of the company 
logo be determined: (a) solve immediately by 
going to an arbiter (arbiter decides blue or 
red or (b) solve by using resources to search 
for a compromise?’ Afterward, all participants 
were given a written description of the study’s 
purpose. 
Results and discussion
The results paralleled those of Study 1. In the 
intra-category condition, 53% of the participants 
recommended resolving the dispute through 
an arbiter, whereas only 21% of the participants 
chose the arbiter in the inter-category condition. 
The two conditions again differed signifi cantly 
in their preferences (χ2(1) = 4.07, p < .05). This 
fi nding minimizes the counter-explanations 
that third parties  are averse to fl ipping a coin in 
inter-category disputes because of its chance com-
ponent or its potentially frivolous appearance. 
As Study 2 illustrates, the aversion to winner-
take-all solutions in inter-category disputes is 
not restricted to circumstances where the out-
come is determined by chance. In this study, 
the winner-take-all solution was determined by 
a deliberative agent—an arbiter. 
Study 3: A common preference
The preference disputes in the fi rst two studies 
were not ones that would evoke a priori theor-
ies involving particular social identities. Never-
theless, participants may have inferred that 
preference differences were related to group 
identity (e.g. Prentice & Miller, 2006; Yzerbyt, 
Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). That is, once they 
learned that preferences and group membership 
covaried, participants could have assumed that 
the dispute was somehow signifi cant for group 
identity. If so, then the observed aversion to 
winner-take-all solutions in inter-category dis-
putes could have refl ected the perception that 
the domains in which such disputes occur are 
more important or central to the categories 
involved. To rule out this possibility, Study 3 
shifted the focus from a situation where the 
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disputants had different preferences to one in 
which they had the same preference.
Method
Participants Altogether, 250 undergraduates 
at the University of Michigan, randomly selected 
from the student directory, were contacted by 
email and invited to participate in an online 
study. Seventy-three of them (approximately 
29%) agreed to do so.
Procedure Everyone read the following scen-
ario: ‘Imagine that 1000 hungry high school 
students from around the country took a break 
to eat lunch at a one-day conference. The con-
ference dining room could only seat half the 
students immediately, whereas the other half 
would have to wait 20 minutes’. Of course, this 
presumes that the students at the conference 
would have preferred to eat lunch immediately. 
Participants were then asked how they would 
solve this problem. Participants in the control 
condition chose between ‘(A) fl ip a coin for 
who gets seated fi rst (heads = last names A-L; 
tails = last names M-Z) or (B) have everyone wait 
20 minutes to be seated’. Of course, Option B 
implies that the dining room is not quite ready 
(for whatever reason) to seat everyone. Partici-
pants in the inter-category condition saw a modifi ed 
wording of Option (A), namely ‘fl ip a coin for 
who gets seated fi rst (heads = girls, tails = boys)’. 
Note that although the use of last names A-L vs. 
M-Z in the control condition arguably refl ects 
different social categories, such categories seem 
much less meaningful than gender, and thus offer 
a suitable control condition for this study. 
Results and discussion
In the control condition, 56% of participants were 
willing to fl ip a coin, thereby letting half of the 
students eat before the other half (based on 
the fi rst letter of their last names), whereas only 
28% of participants in the inter-category condition 
were willing to fl ip a coin when it meant one 
gender would eat before the other. This difference 
between conditions was signifi cant (χ2(1) = 5.71, 
p < .05). In other words, participants were willing 
to favor one set of students over the other when 
the students were divided alphabetically, but not 
when they were divided by gender. Thus, the 
aversion to winner-take-all outcomes in inter-
category disputes does not require an inference 
that preferences correlated with social categor-
ies are more deeply held or symbolically im-
portant. The preference to eat fi rst was equally 
important to everyone.
Study 4: Outcomes and the 
hedonic gap
Studies 1–3 found that participants avoided 
a dispute resolution procedure that yielded a 
winner-take-all solution when the disputants 
belonged to different social categories. Strictly 
speaking, however, we are less interested in 
people’s attitudes toward the procedures that 
yield winner-take-all outcomes than we are 
in people’s attitudes toward the winner-take-
all outcomes themselves. Accordingly, Study 4 
focused on participants’ feelings about the 
acceptability of winner-take-all outcomes, not 
the procedures that produced those outcomes. 
Study 4 also eliminated any references to par-
ticular social categories to ensure that partici-
pants’ choices in the inter-category conditions 
were not infl uenced by any partiality they might 
have for one category over another (Crisp & 
Hewstone, 1999, 2000). 
Study 4 also sought more direct evidence that 
the aversion to winner-take-all outcomes in 
inter-category disputes is driven by a desire to 
minimize the hedonic gap between winners 
and losers, as opposed to simply a concern for 
avoiding intergroup confl icts (see Schopler 
et al., 1995). Free response data were thus elicited 
from participants about the reasoning behind 
their choices (see Haddock & Zanna, 1998). 
Method
Participants Thirty-eight University of Michigan 
undergraduates (22 females and 16 males) com-
pleted a questionnaire that was included in a 
larger ‘Questionnaire Day’ packet. They were 
recruited through fl yers posted around campus, 
as well as by research assistants standing near 
the data collection venue. Participants were paid 
US $10 for completing the entire packet, which 
required approximately an hour of their time. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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Procedure In a between-subjects design, par-
ticipants were assigned to one of two conditions. 
The scenario in the intra-category condition read 
as follows: ‘Imagine a college dorm is getting 
new carpet. Color preference is divided evenly. 
Half the students want red carpet and half want 
blue carpet’. The scenario in the inter-category 
condition was identical, except that: ‘Color pre-
ference is divided evenly along religious lines. 
Students of one religion want red carpet and 
students of another religion want blue carpet’. 
In both conditions, participants were asked, 
‘Is it okay to have a winner-take-all outcome in 
which the carpet is ultimately red or blue? (YES 
or NO)’. They were then asked to explain their 
choices briefl y. Participants were then paid for 
completing the questionnaire packet and given 
an opportunity to learn more about the details 
of the project.
Coding the open-ended responses Four under-
graduate research assistants coded the reasons 
that participants gave for their choices. The 
experimenter trained the coders together, at the 
same time, offering written and oral instructions. 
The coders were blind to the research hypothesis, 
to the experimental conditions from which the 
materials they coded were drawn, and to the 
particular choices that were being justifi ed. 
They fi rst coded for evidence that participants 
had focused on the magnitude of the hedonic 
gap that would arise between disputants if a 
winner-take-all solution were used. The hedonic 
gap instructions were as follows:
Obviously, winning or losing is associated with 
different levels of happiness. The winners are 
happy and the losers are unhappy. We use the term 
“hedonic gap” to refl ect the difference between the 
happiness of the winners and the unhappiness of 
the losers. To the extent the winners feel victorious 
and the losers feel defeated, the “hedonic gap” is 
large. On the other hand, to the extent that winners 
feel nominally happy and the losers nominally 
unhappy, the “hedonic gap” is small. Shortly, you 
will be rating a random list of comments. Your 
task will be to indicate a check next to every com-
ment that refl ects a concern for preempting this 
hedonic gap, as we’ve just discussed. Please read 
carefully through each of the comments. 
We also coded responses for evidence that an 
aversion to winner-take-all solutions was based on 
a desire to minimize the potential for intergroup 
hostility. The group tension instructions were 
identical to the hedonic gap instructions, except 
for the following insertion: ‘Often times when 
there is a dispute, people become concerned with
preempting tension between two groups. We 
use the term “group tension” to refl ect confl ict 
or tension between groups. Shortly…’ The coders 
received a spreadsheet with the participants’ 
responses randomly arranged and made a check 
next to each response to indicate whether it 
refl ected a concern for the hedonic gap  and/or 
a concern for group tension. Statements coded as 
re-fl ecting a concern for preempting the hedonic 
gap included ‘because only half would be satisfi ed 
and the other half would not’, and statements 
of group tension included ‘It creates tension be-
tween the two groups’.
Results and discussion
In the intra-category condition, 79% of the 
participants agreed that it was acceptable to 
have a winner-take-all outcome. However, in 
the inter-category condition, only 21% of the par-
ticipants were willing to accept a winner-take-all 
outcome. This difference between conditions 
was significant (χ2(df = 1) = 12.7, p < .001). 
There was no signifi cant effect of gender on 
participants’ responses. The results support 
our claim that the aversion to winner-take-all 
procedures in inter-category disputes is based 
on the outcomes they produce, not on the 
procedures themselves.
Indices of the concern for preempting the 
hedonic gap and group tension were created by 
averaging the coders’ check-marks. If all four 
coders checked something, then it received 
an index score of 1.00. If three coders checked 
it, then it received an index score of 0.75. If two 
coders checked it, then it received an index 
score of 0.50. If one coder checked it, then it 
received an index score of 0.25. If no coder 
checked it, then it received an index score of 0. 
Three participants did not respond to the 
open-ended question and thus were not in-
cluded in the coding analysis. To assess coder 
587
Garcia & Miller aversion to winner-take-all solutions
reliability, we computed Cohen’s kappa for each 
coder pair. Because there were four coders, there 
were six possible coder pairs. The kappa values 
for the hedonic gap ratings for the six pairings 
ranged from .77 to .25, with a significance 
range from p = .000 to p = .089 and an average 
kappa of .44 and an average p of .02. Only one 
pair of coders showed marginally signifi cant 
agreement (kappa = .25, p = .089). The Kappa 
values for the six coder pairings of the group 
tension ratings ranged from .66 to .42, with a 
signi-fi cance range from p = .000 to p = .008 
(average kappa = .51, average p = .003). All of 
this indi-cates that the coding of both hedonic 
gap and group tension concerns was done 
reliably. 
To better understand the role that hedonic gap 
and group tension concerns played in participants’ 
choices, we conducted two separate mediation 
analyses (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). First, 
as expected, a logistic regression (B = 2.64, 
Wald = 11.0, p < .01) showed that dispute 
context (1 = intra-category, 2 = inter-category) was a 
signifi cant predictor of outcome (1 = accepting 
or 2 = not accepting a winner-take-all outcome). 
Second, a standard regression showed that 
dispute context was a signifi cant predictor of 
the hedonic gap index scores (B = .47, β = .67, 
p < .001). Finally, when both dispute context 
and hedonic gap index scores were used to predict 
outcomes, a logistic regression showed that 
hedonic gap was a signifi cant predictor of outcome 
(B = 12.3, Wald = 7.4, p < .01), but dispute con-
text was not (B = .18, Wald = .02, p = .90). A 
Sobel’s test also showed that the reduction in 
the regression coeffi cient for dispute context 
was signifi cant (Sobel = 2.40, p < .05). Thus, it 
appears that concern with the magnitude of the 
hedonic gap mediates the relationship between 
dispute context and outcomes. 
We also found that dispute context was a 
signifi cant predictor of the group tension index 
scores (B = .30, β = .45, p < .01). However, when 
both dispute context and group tension index 
scores were used to predict outcomes, group ten-
sion was only a marginally signifi cant predictor of 
outcomes (B = 4.47, Wald = 3.8, p = .0502), and 
dispute context remained signifi cant (B = 2.01, 
Wald = 5.0, p < .05). Thus, group tension, though 
related to dispute context and outcomes, did 
not appear to mediate their relationship with 
one another. Supporting this claim, a follow-up 
logistic regression analysis of outcomes with 
both hedonic gap and group tension as predictors 
(along with dispute context) revealed that hedonic 
gap was signifi cant (B = 13.8, Wald = 5.4, p < .05), 
but group tension was not (B = –1.42, Wald = .18, 
p = .67).
It is important to note that the hedonic gap 
and group tension ratings were highly correlated 
(r = .73, p < .001). So (despite the results from 
our regression analyses) it is diffi cult to separate 
these two constructs. However, the results seem 
to indicate that the aversion people have for 
resolving inter-category disputes in a winner-
take-all manner is not based solely on their fear 
that such outcomes will produce intergroup 
confl ict. The belief that the gap in the emotional 
reactions of the winners and losers will be great 
is suffi cient to steer third-party deciders away 
from winner-take-all solutions. People just don’t 
want to create a situation that results in having 
winners and losers if the winner and losers will 
represent different social categories. Of course, 
when the preferences involve more serious issues 
than carpet color (e.g. one country wants to pur-
sue nuclear technology, but another does not 
want that to happen), concerns about group 
confl ict may play a stronger role, though the 
anticipation of a hedonic gap might still  precede 
this concern.
Study 5: Increasing the hedonic gap
Study 4 produced evidence that people are con-
cerned about the hedonic gap between winners 
and losers in inter-category disputes. Some of this 
evidence came from participants’ justifi cation 
for their choices. Such data can be valuable in 
uncovering psychological mechanisms (e.g. 
Haddock & Zanna, 1998), but are not without 
limitations (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Accordingly, we manipulated the perceived 
magnitude of the hedonic gap in Study 5, so 
that we could more directly assess its role in 
the aversion to winner-take-all outcomes. Our 
prediction was that an aversion to winner-
take-all outcomes in inter-category disputes 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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would only occur when there was a potential 
hedonic gap.
Method 
Participants Altogether, 103 undergraduates 
(49 females and 54 males) from the University 
of Michigan and Bowling Green State University 
completed a questionnaire that was included in 
a larger ‘Questionnaire Day’ packet. Students 
were recruited by fl yers posted around campus 
advertising research on decision-making and 
attitudes. They were paid US $8 for completing 
the entire packet, which required approximately 
45 minutes of their time.
Procedure Participants in the high hedonic gap 
condition read the same scenario used in the 
inter-category condition of Study 4 (‘…Students 
of one religion want red carpet and students of 
another religion want blue carpet.’). Participants 
in the low hedonic gap condition read the same 
scenario, but with one additional sentence: 
‘Despite their preferences, neither side will be 
upset if the carpet is ultimately red or blue’. We 
focused on the inter-category context because 
the aversion to winner-take-all solutions is 
greatest in that context. Note that the control 
condition was identical to the intra-category 
condition of Study 4 (‘…Half the students want 
red carpet and half want blue carpet.’). All 
participants were asked whether it was accept-
able to resolve the dispute in a winner-take-all 
manner. Participants were then paid and given 
an opportunity to learn more about the details 
of the project.
Results and discussion
The results supported the prediction (χ2(df = 1) = 
14.3, p < .01). Only 34% of participants in the 
high hedonic gap condition were willing to resolve 
the inter-category dispute with a winner-take-all 
outcome, compared to 70% of participants in 
the low hedonic gap condition. This difference 
between conditions was signifi cant (χ2(1) = 8.90, 
p < .01). Not surprisingly, 77% of participants in 
the control condition accepted a winner-take-all 
outcome; this percentage was not signifi cantly 
different from the percentage found in the low 
hedonic gap condition (c2(1) = .35, p = .56). Again, 
there were no signifi cant effects of gender on 
participants’ responses. 
These results suggest that people are reluctant 
to resolve inter-category disputes with winner-
take-all outcomes only when they expect such 
an outcome to produce a large hedonic gap. 
When that concern is allayed, third parties are 
as comfortable with winner-take-all solutions in 
inter-category disputes as in intra-category dis-
putes. Taken together, Studies 4 and 5 provide 
strong support for the claim that a concern with 
minimizing the hedonic gap between winners 
and losers mediates third parties’ aversion 
to winner-take-all outcomes in inter-category 
disputes.
Study 6: Social category 
meaningfulness 
Study 6 examined the hypothesis that the im-
pact of a hedonic gap might depend on the 
meaningfulness of the social category dimension. 
Not all social categories are equally important 
to people (McGarty, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and not all inter-
category disputes are equally meaningful to 
the disputants (e.g. McGarty, 1999; Haslam, 
McGarty, & Brown, 1996). In Study 6, we thus 
manipulated the meaningfulness of the social 
categories involved in a dispute. By increasing 
the meaningfulness of the social categories, 
but holding the issue constant, we expected to 
increase the anticipated size of the hedonic gap 
between the winning and losing sides, thereby 
strengthening people’s reluctance to resolve the 
dispute in a winner-take-all manner. 
Method
Participants Seventy-six University of Michigan 
undergraduates (42 females and 34 males) 
completed a questionnaire that was included in 
a larger ‘Questionnaire Day’ packet. Students 
were recruited by fl yers posted around campus 
advertising research on decision-making and 
attitudes. They were paid US$10 for completing 
the entire packet, which required approximately 
an hour of their time.
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Procedure
Acceptance of a winner-take-all outcome In this 
study, we used a within-subjects design because 
we thought it would be more sensitive than a 
between-subjects design to the true strength 
of people’s attitudes and preferences (see 
Camerer, 1995). Participants were asked how 
appropriate it would be to resolve a variety of 
inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner. 
Participants were asked to ‘Imagine that an 
organization is planning to offer a new company 
benefi t. Because disputes can often be divided 
along many different lines, the following fi ve 
disputes represent different divisions that could 
occur within an organization’. At this point, 
participants read fi ve different inter-category 
disputes. In every case, one side wanted a new 
‘fitness center’ and the other side wanted 
‘dental care’. 
The fi ve social category divisions involved 
culture (one culture of employees wants fi tness 
center vs. another culture of employees wants 
dental care), nationality (Japanese vs. French 
employees), coast (East Coast vs. West Coast 
employees), handedness (left-handed vs. right-
handed employees), and water-taste preference 
(tap-water drinking vs. bottled-water drinking 
employees).1 After reading about each of 
these fi ve disputes, participants responded to 
the question, ‘How appropriate would it be to 
have a winner-take-all outcome in which the 
benefi t is ultimately a new “fi tness center” or 
“dental care”? (1 = not appropriate, 7 = very 
appropriate)’. The order of the fi ve disputes 
was rotated across participants. Again, in 
every case, the dispute was over differing pre-
ferences for the new company benefi t—the 
fi tness center versus dental care. What varied 
was the social category line along which these 
two preferences divided.
Coding the magnitude of the anticipated hedonic gap 
Five undergraduate students coded the size of 
the hedonic gap for each of the fi ve disputes. 
Blind to the research hypothesis, and to the par-
ticipants’ ratings of the winner-take-all outcome, 
the coders were given instructions for coding the 
hedonic gap similar to those used in Study 4: 
‘Obviously, winning or losing is associated with 
different levels of happiness...’ The coders then 
proceeded to rate the size of the hedonic gap for 
each of the disputes: ‘Assume that a winner-take-
all outcome occurred. Estimate the size of the 
“hedonic gap” between the side whose preference 
was chosen and the side whose preference was 
not chosen (1 = small gap, 7 = enormous gap)’. 
The disputes were presented in a random order 
for each rater. 
Results and discussion
We fi rst examined participants’ ratings of the ap-
propriateness of winner-take-all outcomes across 
the fi ve disputes. In ascending order of appro-
priateness, these were: culture (M = 3.07, SD = 1.79), 
nationality (M = 3.33, SD = 1.76), coast (M = 3.63, 
SD = 1.83), handedness (M = 3.72, SD = 2.10), and 
water-taste preference (M = 3.76, SD = 1.99). A 
repeated measures analysis of variance on these 
ratings showed signifi cant differences across 
disputes (F(4,300) = 4.72 p < .01).
Follow-up t tests showed that culture (t(75) = 4.5, 
p < .001) and nationality (t(75) = 3.3, p < .01) were 
signifi cantly different from the scale midpoint, 
and coast (t(75) = 1.8, p = .08) was marginally dif-
ferent from that point. Paired t tests also showed 
that water-taste pre-ference was significantly 
different from culture (t(75) = 3.23, p < .01) and 
nationality (t(75) = 2.02, p < .05), and that cul-
ture was signifi cantly different from handedness 
(t(75) = 3.09, p < .01), coast (t(75) = 2.84, 
p < .01), and nationality (t(75) = 2.79, p < .01). 
Nationality was marginally different from 
handedness (t(75) = 1.86, p = .07). Again, there 
were no signifi cant gender effects.
As for the coders’ ratings of the hedonic gap, 
we created an index by averaging across their 
responses. An intra-class correlation showed high 
consistency among the coders (r = .75, p < .001). 
A repeated measures analysis of variance on 
their ratings also showed signifi cant differences 
across disputes (F(4,16) = 16.50, p < .001). In 
descending order, the mean index scores were: 
culture (M = 5.6, SD = 1.14), nationality (M = 5.0, 
SD = 0.7), coast (M = 4.2, SD = 1.1), handedness 
(M = 2.2, SD = 0.8), and water-taste preference 
(M = 1.8, SD = 0.8).
Follow-up t tests showed that culture (t(4) = 3.1, 
p < .05), nationality (t(4) = 3.2, p < .05), handedness 
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(t(4) = 4.8, p < .01), and water-taste (t(4) = 5.9, 
p < .01) were all signifi cantly different from 
the scale midpoint. Additional t tests revealed 
that water-taste was significantly different 
from coast (t(4) = 3.2, p < .05), nationality 
(t(4) = 8.6, p < .01), and culture (t(4) = 7.8, 
p < .01). Handedness was signifi cantly different 
from nationality (t(4) = 7.5, p < .01) and culture 
(t(4) = 6.7, p < .01). Marginally different were 
handedness and coast (t(4) = 2.4, p = .08), and 
nationality and culture (t(4) = 2.4, p < .07).
Finally, a correlation analysis showed a strong 
inverse relationship between the fi ve mean rat-
ings of the anticipated winner-loser hedonic 
gaps and the fi ve mean ratings of the appropri-
ateness of winner-take-all outcomes (r(4) = –.91, 
p < .05). Although this correlation could be 
interpreted in more than one way, it is consistent 
with the proposed link between an aversion 
to winner-take-all outcomes and the size of 
the hedonic gap between winners and losers. 
It thus complements the mediation analyses 
and hedonic gap manipulations of Studies 4 
and 5. The results of Study 6 also reveal that 
the magnitude of the hedonic gap that people 
expect to arise between winners and losers 
can vary considerably across social categories.
Whether those employees wanting dental care 
or those wanting a fi tness center get their wish 
is expected to have much greater emotional 
impact when those requesting each represent 
different cultures than when they represent 
different handedness.
General discussion
Across a variety of issues and contexts, we found 
converging evidence that third parties are averse 
to resolving disputes between different social 
categories with winner-take-all solutions. Study 1 
showed that in an inter-category dispute, people 
would rather select a mutually less preferred 
option than fl ip a coin to determine whose fi rst 
preference will be chosen. Study 2 showed that 
the aversion to winner-take-all solutions also 
occurs when the fi nal choice is made by an 
arbiter. Study 3 showed that the aversion does 
not depend on any naive theory people might 
have about how preferences are related to the 
identities of the social categories involved in 
the dispute. Study 4 showed that a concern 
for minimizing the hedonic gap mediates the 
relationship between dispute context and the 
aversion to winner-take-all outcomes. Study 5 
provided further evidence for the hedonic gap 
mechanism—the aversion to winner-take-all 
outcomes diminished considerably when the 
possibility of a hedonic gap was removed. Finally, 
Study 6 showed that the meaningfulness of the 
social categories involved in a dispute moderates 
the magnitude of the expected hedonic gap and 
people’s aversion to winner-take-all outcomes. 
Implications for management and policy 
making
Experts from the confl ict resolution literature 
have long recommended that third parties ensure 
procedural justice so that disputants will more 
readily accept distributive outcomes (e.g. Lind & 
Tyler, 1988). What is striking about our research 
results is that third parties clearly become more 
concerned with distributive outcomes, specifi -
cally winner-take-all outcomes, than with pro-
cedural issues when preferences divide along 
social category lines. Even when a procedural 
mechanism (e.g. a coin toss) unequivocally 
treats disputing parties equally, third parties still 
seem disturbed by a winner-take-all outcome. 
Hence, uninvolved third parties, who are most 
capable of maximizing the joint gains between 
dissenting factions in competitive environments 
(Raiffa, 1982), may fi nd it especially diffi cult to 
do so when one social category can objectively 
claim more value than another social category, 
regardless of the procedural mechanism. Giving 
disputants the opportunity to voice concerns 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975) or treating them 
with respect (Tyler & Blader, 2003) may indeed 
matter less when the distributive outcome is 
ultimately winner-take-all and the disputants 
belong to different social categories. 
A notable real world example is fi nal offer 
arbitration (Grigsby & Bigoness, 1982; Kochan, 
1980). In fi nal offer arbitration, disputing parties 
each submit a proposal to the arbitrator after 
the fi nal round of negotiation. The arbiter then 
chooses one side’s proposal, which both parties 
are obliged to follow. In conventional arbitration, 
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by contrast, an arbitrator works directly with both 
parties to craft a negotiated settlement. Because 
the cost of disagreement is so high in fi nal offer 
arbitration, it generally leads to settlements 
with greater joint gains than does conventional 
arbitration (Bazerman & Farber, 1985; Farber 
& Bazerman, 1987; Neale & Bazerman, 1983), 
because disputants are motivated to submit 
proposals that will ultimately be chosen by the 
arbitrator. However, our research suggests that 
fi nal offer arbitration might be more diffi cult 
to utilize in inter-category disputes because of 
its winner-take-all qualities. Hence, people may 
prefer conventional arbitration in disputes that 
cross social category lines, rather than using 
the more deal-maximizing fi nal offer form of 
arbitration. 
Future directions
Future research could productively build upon 
our work both methodologically and theor-
etically. With respect to methodology, it would be 
desirable to explore reactions to winner-take-all 
outcomes in a non-scenario context. This would 
be especially helpful for gaining insights into 
the reactions of the disputants themselves, to 
complement fi ndings on the pain of upward 
social comparison and unwillingness to tolerate 
disadvantageous inequality in inter-category 
allocations (Garcia, et al., 2005). For example, 
we could measure the actual hedonic gap experi-
enced by winners and losers of a winner-take-all 
outcome, and perhaps even compare actual 
gaps with gaps perceived by third parties. Our 
scenario methodology, which by design was 
simple and artifi cial, is more appropriate for 
examining the reactions of third parties, who 
are usually more detached. 
Although our analysis suggests that third party 
deciders are averse to resolving inter-category 
disputes with winner-take-all solutions because 
they are trying to preempt a hedonic gap, an 
important question remains—why does a 
hedonic gap matter to third party deciders 
in these situations? There are many possible 
answers. Creating a hedonic gap may be viewed 
as inherently unfair. Perhaps people don’t like 
creating hedonic gaps because they seem to 
be promoting disharmony. Or perhaps third 
party deciders fear retaliation from the losing 
side. Admittedly, these and other reasons are 
likely to depend on the situation. A third party 
decider who is a political fi gure might be con-
cerned about creating hedonic gaps for fear 
of retaliation, whereas a third party decider 
who is an ombudsperson might be concerned 
with hedonic gaps for the sake of fairness. 
Nevertheless, we did not investigate why hedonic 
gaps matter, and that remains an important 
research question.
Future research could also explore variables that 
are known to be important to the categorization 
process more broadly. These include cross-
categorization (e.g. Crisp & Hewstone, 1999), 
stereotypic preferences (e.g. Yzerbyt et al., 
1997), and the meaningfulness of the social 
categories (e.g. McGarty, 1999). Researchers 
might also consider people’s concern with ap-
pearing discriminatory (Pettigrew & Meertens, 
1995). For example, although Study 1 used a 
random coin toss as a winner-take-all solution, 
the outcome may have implied discrimination, 
despite the impartiality of the coin toss. Another 
important variable might be the perceived en-
titlement of the disputing groups to the contested 
resource. If people felt that the entitlement of 
one group was greater than that of the other 
group, then would they still be more reluctant 
to see the deserving group get everything? Con-
sider a dispute between two countries. Imagine 
that the two countries were either both developed 
(or both developing), or that one was a developed 
country and the other a developing country. 
Would a third party be more averse to a winner-
take- all outcome in the latter case? The answer is 
not obvious, especially if the third party thought 
the resource should be distributed on the basis 
of need (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). 
Finally, a practical question remains: What is 
the minimum correlation between preferences 
and social categories needed to trigger the 
hedonic gap mechanism? For instance, if only 
70% of the people in one social category want A 
and 70% of the people in another social cate-
gory want B, would one still be concerned about 
minimizing the hedonic gap? What if the per-
centages were 90% in one social category and 
50% in the other? Future research should also 
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explore whether the size of a social category 
matters. We focused on social categories that 
contain many members (e.g. nationality, state 
residence, etc.). Is the aversion effect weaker 
when the categories are smaller? Research on 
these and other issues will clarify the necessary 
minimum conditions for the aversion effect 
and perhaps even help policy makers, who 
often monitor public opinion across different 
demographic groups, to better predict when 
winner-take-all solutions will be more or less 
acceptable.
Note
1. By ‘culture’, we meant the customs and so on of 
a particular work group (see Levine & Moreland, 
1991). There was no evidence that participants 
had trouble understanding our meaning.
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